This paper extends the literature on analyst optimism. Our analysis of a large sample of recommendations issued from 1995 through 2006 indicates that sell-side analysts are likely to assign frequent and favorable ratings to a stock after the analysts' affiliated mutual funds invest in that stock. Controlling for a number of variables, including the ties between analysts and investment banks, we find that the greater the portfolio weight of a stock in the fund family, the more optimistic the stock ratings from affiliated analysts become. Since 2002, analysts' optimism on stocks held by affiliated mutual funds has declined. However, an analyst's decision of upgrading a stock to a ''strong buy'' rating is still significantly associated with the portfolio weight of that stock in the fund family.
Introduction
The dynamics between a full-service brokerage firm and its sell-side analysts often bears some scrutiny because it could raise ethical issues related to the interests of investors. Sell-side analysts (those employed by a brokerage firm) generally provide favorable research reports not only on newly listed stocks but also on seasoned stocks. From 1995 through 2001, only 4% of all recommendations on seasoned stocks were rated ''underperform'' or ''sell''. Most recommendations issued during that period were favorable, up to the rating of ''strong buy''. Even after 2002, when new National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and NYSE rules required that analysts disclose the past year's ratings assigned to a stock at the end of each report, analyst tendency toward optimism has persisted and stock recommendations are still biased upward. 1 analysts to write research reports when they can ''talk up'' firms (Francis and Philbrick, 1993) . Second, the brokers' objective of generating trading commissions also leads analysts to issue optimistic reports to attract orders from those investors who are subject to short-selling constraints (Hayes, 1998; Irvine, 2001; Jackson, 2005; Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy, 2006) . Third, a great amount of attention among scholars and regulators focuses on the hypothesis that investment banking affiliation acts as an influencing factor. That is, analysts affiliated with an investment bank fear the loss of future underwriting business and so make recommendations about client stock that are more optimistic than recommendations of unaffiliated analysts (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999) .
This paper builds on current literature by extensively testing the hypothesis of mutual fund affiliation as an additional explanation for analyst optimism about seasoned stocks. As described in Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) and Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) , the US assetmanagement industry is concentrated into a number of mutual fund families. Each fund family is typically affiliated with a brokerage house that provides trading services and sell-side research to investors. Reuter (2006) finds that the fund family is usually an important investor who pays a disproportionate share of trading commissions to the affiliated brokerage firm. Mahoney (2004) explains that the fund family often pays sales commissions to the affiliated brokers for marketing its shares.
2 This paper conjectures that, once a mutual fund family invests in a stock, the affiliated brokerage analysts have an economic incentive to research that stock and also to promote its purchase by recommending it. The incentive persists as long as the fund family holds a significant position in the stock. If so, such intra-family dynamics could have regulatory implications that the 2002 analyst rules left out. Mutual fund managers value unbiased research as a tool to form their investment decisions. While buy-side analysts employed by fund managers are not expected to be biased in their estimates, sell-side analysts could be. In the late 1990s, some conflicts of interest involving highly reputable analysts raised concerns about the impartiality of sell-side research. In particular, analysts were alleged to have biased some reports to favor their investment bank's clients. Cheng, Liu, and Qian (2006) find that fund managers rely mostly on buy-side research to make portfolio decisions. However, research provided by sell-side analysts can be valuable to fund managers (Groysberg, Healy, Chapman, Shanthikumar, and Gui, 2007) and research provided by the affiliated sell-side analysts can be exceptionally valuable. As shown by Irvine, Simko, and Nathan (2004) , affiliated analysts' earnings forecasts are more accurate than other analysts' forecasts.
To meet demands for research from their affiliated fund managers, sell-side analysts are motivated to cover those stocks in which the fund family has invested. Even though this research is generally paid for by commissions to the analyst's trading department (Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal, 2001) , such research has a limited potential to generate additional trading business and to enhance the analyst's compensation that is based on brokerage revenues. To generate the greatest amount of trading business from the research provided to the affiliated fund managers, analysts make their reports available to the public. The objectives of currying favor with management, generating trading business, or supporting investment banking business provide an analyst with an incentive to release favorable reports. Here, we hypothesize that the family affiliation provides analysts with a further incentive to promptly issue reports with positive prospects on stocks held by affiliated mutual funds and to reluctantly release those with negative prospects. The preference for supporting or the fear of hurting the performance of the fund family would make the affiliated analysts more optimistic than unaffiliated analysts.
Favoritism among the divisions of a full-service brokerage firm is not new to literature. In Ritter and Zhang (2007) , the analysis of the ties between investment banks and their affiliated mutual funds during initial public offerings (IPOs) indicates that investment banking departments support the performance of asset management departments. During the Internet bubble period of 1999-2000, some evidence arose that investment banks allocated ''hot'' IPOs to their affiliated funds specifically to boost the fund performance and attract more money inflows. As shown in Johnson and Marietta-Westberg (2005) , benefits are reciprocal within a full-service brokerage firm. Such IPO allocations to affiliated mutual funds help the bank earn more underwriting business. Massa and Rehman (2008) find that mutual funds selectively increase their holdings in firms that have borrowed from their commercial bank. As a result of acting on inside information, the affiliated mutual funds enhance their performance. More to the point, Chung and Cho (2005) analyze the links between brokerage analysts and dealers. They find that analysts cover stocks that are handled by affiliated dealers and issue optimistic reports on them to generate order flow. This paper thus examines the tie between a brokerage house and its affiliated mutual funds, seeing it as a rationale for explaining analyst optimism about seasoned stocks. While brokerage firms benefit from the higher commissions that optimistic research generates, mutual fund families can benefit from positive research about the stocks they hold. 3 In fact, the compensation of a money 3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the fund family can benefit from optimistic research provided by its sell-side analysts. From April 2000 to January 2001, Michael Ching, a Merrill Lynch analyst, reiterated ''buy'' recommendations on Metawave Communications Corp. when the stock price was deteriorating and a private equity fund, managed by Merrill Lynch for the benefit of its employees, was selling that stock. This case manager is typically a function of fund assets that increase as a result of marketing efforts and fund performance. Sirri and Tufano (1998) show a nonlinear relation between fund performance and money inflows: Poor fund performers experience almost no impact on inflows, while top fund performers considerably increase their inflows. As shown by James and Karceski (2006) , retail investors drive the positive relation between past performance and subsequent inflows. Retail investors who are likely to chase past returns are also most responsive to analyst recommendations (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007) . We measure an analyst's optimism as the analyst's tendency to issue recommendations that upgrade a stock to the ''strong buy'' list. Not surprisingly, an upgrade to the ''strong buy'' rating represents the greatest level of optimism because it is not only the highest rating an analyst can award to a stock but it is also an unequivocal indication that the analyst's prior views on that stock have been exceeded. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) find that an upgrade to ''strong buy'' on a stock produces the greatest market impact, significantly higher than a reiterated ''strong buy''. In this paper, we use a duration-analysis model to describe dynamically observable patterns in brokerage research with concomitant changes in mutual fund investments. Instead of analyzing analyst optimism at a particular time, our approach has the advantage of capturing the persistence of analysts' disposition toward seasoned stocks over a long period, the 12 years from 1995 through 2006, covering the Internet bubble and its subsequent burst. Data regarding analyst coverage and mutual funds holdings come from Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and CDA/Spectrum quarterly 13f holdings, respectively.
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The larger question is: Do a mutual fund's stock holdings affect the research produced by analysts affiliated with that mutual fund? The evidence we collect by assessing a large sample of analyst recommendations says yes, it does in several respects. First, mutual fund affiliation affects analysts' decisions about providing research on stocks. We find that brokerage analysts report research on a stock more frequently after the affiliated mutual funds add it in their portfolios. Second, analysts are significantly optimistic about stocks that are held by mutual fund families. To be specific, affiliated analysts are 13% more likely to upgrade a stock to a ''strong buy'' rating than are unaffiliated analysts. Since 2002, affiliated analysts' optimism has declined. Third, the more the mutual funds invest in a stock, the greater is the affiliated analysts' optimism. When a mutual fund family increases the portfolio weight of a stock investment by 1%, the probability that the affiliated analysts upgrade that stock to a ''strong buy'' rating rises 25%, after statistical controls for stock characteristics and performance are applied.
Do reputational risk and career concerns restrain analysts' optimism? Reputation partly curbs analysts' optimism on stocks held by the affiliated mutual funds. We find that, from 1999 through 2001, analysts selected by Institutional Investor as ''stars'' were most optimistic in their reports when they covered stocks held by affiliated mutual funds. However, as predicted by Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2007) , we also find that analyst recommendations on stocks highly visible to institutional investors are less likely to be influenced by family pressure. Analysts are more likely to promote, instead, stocks that are less visible to other institutions as a strategy to support the interests of the affiliated mutual funds while acquiring no chilling effect on their reputation. The negative relation between analyst optimism on a stock and the institutional presence in that stock frames the mutual fund affiliation as an important explanation for analyst optimism.
Do market participants recognize the bias from the mutual fund affiliation? The answer depends on the size of research departments. In the short run, investors discount the quality of recommendations by analysts working for small research departments, because of analyst incentives to look favorably at stocks held by the fund family. In contrast, investors seem to assign qualities of superior information to large research departments' recommendations on the stocks in affiliated fund portfolios. Within large research departments, an upgrade of these stocks to ''strong buy'' yields a median three-day abnormal return of 2.03% centered on the report day, compared with 1.36% for reports generated by unaffiliated analysts. We find that downgrades by affiliated analysts are greeted as negatively as downgrades by unaffiliated analysts. Timing can explain this asymmetry in the price reaction. That is, when analysts cover stocks held by affiliated mutual funds, they appear more eager to release positive ratings than negative ratings.
Over the long run, value accrues to investors acting on the positive recommendations about stocks within an analyst's fund family. Following the methodology in Barber, Lehavy, McNicols, and Trueman (2001) , we find that upgrades to ''strong buy'' issued by large affiliated departments produce an annualized Fama and French three-factor abnormal return of 5.92%, compared with 4.07% from upgrades to ''strong buy'' by large unaffiliated departments. However, the affiliated analysts' pessimism is less valuable than their optimism. Selling a stock short when an affiliated analyst issues ''sell'' ratings generates no significant abnormal return. When the sells are issued by unaffiliated analysts, the Fama and French three-factor abnormal return is significantly higher, 4.32%. Abnormal returns computed by a market model lead to a similar qualitative conclusion: Mutual fund affiliation is an element that biases analysts' eagerness to release positive or negative stock reports.
In this study, mutual fund affiliation is defined as a case in which analysts cover a stock already held by the affiliated fund family. Even though our analysis uses onequarter lagged data for holdings, we also test the inverse causality that analyst optimism affects the affiliated fund holdings, because information flows within a full-service brokerage firm might run in two directions. Irvine, Simko, and Nathan (2004) forecasts does not affect the investments by the fund family. Anecdotal evidence suggests that analyst recommendation itself is unlikely to influence a money manager's investment decision. 4 Similarly, we find little evidence of simultaneous effects between analyst recommendations and affiliated fund holdings. An upgrade to a ''strong buy'' rating is not significantly associated with any change in the weight of a stock in the family portfolios, while a downgrade observed in a quarter is associated (at the 4% level of statistical significance) with a decrease in the stock weight reported at the end of that quarter. A stock's performance and the size of other institutional investors' holdings better explain the changes in the affiliated fund portfolios than do revisions in analyst recommendations. Limited by the quarterly update of 13f holdings and naturally lacking access to the information flows inside a brokerage firm, we must conclude that the robustness tests do not refute that mutual fund affiliation is one causal link leading to analyst optimism. This paper extends the literature on analyst optimism. Few authors analyze the important relations between brokerage analysts and mutual funds.
5 Irvine, Simko, and Nathan (2004) conclude from analyses of earnings forecasts that bundling brokerage research and asset management services produces only positive externalities for investors, such as more accurate analyst estimates. Our analysis of recommendations, however, lends to a more conservative position. Although bundling brokerage research and asset management can benefit all investors by giving them a higher amount of timely (though optimistic) research, it appears that bundling reduces analysts' motivation to release pessimistic research. Thus, investors who rely on negative investment recommendations by sell-side analysts affiliated with mutual funds receive lower benefits than those who rely on unaffiliated analysts' assessments. Just as with insider trading (Leland, 1992; Meulbroek, 1992) and analyst tipping (Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett, 2006) , the net effect of bundling brokerage research and asset management is uncertain. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the hypotheses and research design of this paper, and Section 3 describes sampling procedures. In Section 4, we present the univariate analysis of mutual fund affiliation as another explanation of analysts' decisions to provide favorable stock coverage. Section 5 shows formal tests of our hypotheses using multivariate duration analysis and other econometric methods to probe the robustness of our results. Section 6 assesses the value of analyst recommendations in the presence of mutual fund affiliation. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize our findings and their implications for future research.
Hypotheses and research design
Prior studies and anecdotal evidence show that the socalled Chinese walls between investment banking and brokerage departments do not work well, because analyst research is often used as a marketing tool to support the underwriting business. Just as analysts have the capacity to help the affiliated investment bank by reporting favorably on client stocks, they could also be encouraged to support the affiliated asset-management business by positively recommending mutual fund investments. Following the expositional analogy about the investment banking affiliation, our first two hypotheses are as follows.
Hypothesis 1. Brokerage analysts are more likely to provide coverage on seasoned stocks held by affiliated mutual funds.
Hypothesis 2. Brokerage analysts are more likely to provide optimistic coverage on seasoned stocks held by affiliated mutual funds.
Moreover, we argue that the preference for supporting or the fear of hurting the performance of the fund family makes analyst recommendations more optimistic on the stocks with a significant weight in the family portfolios. In fact, the costs of issuing unfavorable recommendations would be greater for these stocks than other stocks (Womack, 1996) . So, our third hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 3. The greater the weight of a stock investment in the mutual fund portfolios, the more optimistic the recommendations by affiliated analysts on that stock.
To test these three hypotheses, we model analyst coverage and optimism as an analyst's decisions about covering (recommending) a stock again after he or she has decided to cover (recommend) it once. We thus track all the stocks covered by brokerage analysts at the end of 1994 over a 48-quarter sample period by taking into account several time-varying features of the subject and the object of coverage, such as the analyst's affiliation and the stock's weight in the family portfolios. Data come from multiple databases: I/B/E/S, Securities Data Company (SDC), the 13f Institutional and Mutual Funds Holdings databases, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and CRSP/Compustat Merged.
Given the focus on seasoned stocks, our research design does not include succeeding coverage initiations, which mostly relate to newly listed companies. Four rationales support this choice. First, Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Mola and Loughran (2004) show that the composition of the equity issuers gradually changed in the mid-1990s. A higher number of young Internet-related firms reporting negative earnings went public or conducted seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Confining the
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4 ''Occasionally an analyst gives the bankers and their clients the higher ratings they want-often with a tidily positive rating like 'outperform'. But in the candid conversations between analysts and institutional investors, the nuances of an investment are discussed. Official ratings almost never come up. That's because institutional investors do not care about ratings. Fund managers are not schoolchildren looking for instructions on what to buy. They look to analysts for specific information and general insight '' (New York Times, 2002, p. 31 analysis to the population of stocks covered in 1994 allows us to contain the change in stock characteristics as a factor affecting analysts' decisions. Second, as shown by Ritter and Zhang (2007) and Johnson and Marietta-Westberg (2005) , investment banking affiliation and mutual fund affiliation after an IPO are likely to work together, making it difficult to disentangle their influence on an analyst's behavior. Third, as reported in O'Brien, McNichols, and Lin (2005) and Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2008) , an initiation of analyst coverage does not necessarily mark the beginning of a long-lasting relation between a brokerage house and a newly listed firm. After receiving the first reports, IPOs experience a drop in coverage, especially by nonunderwriter analysts. Fourth, testing Hypothesis 1 implies determining a measure of analyst attention. Focusing on stocks covered in 1994 allows us to determine a coverage rate that captures the attention analysts pay to a given set of stocks over time, instead of the productivity analysts achieve by covering all stocks. Nevertheless, the choice about subsequent additions to the list of covered stocks does not affect the robustness of our results.
In this study, a decision by analysts to report on a stock is described as a time-to-event in a duration model. We record the event from time 0, defined as when the event has occurred for all cross-sectional units. While the crosssectional structure of the sample is driven by the arbitrary time selection, results from a hazard regression model are not, because duration analysis explains the event exploiting the time variation in the explanatory factors from the time origin. Moreover, duration analysis has the methodological advantage of capturing causality links while dealing with censoring issues. The explanatory factors used to model the event of reporting on a stock can be influenced by past events. Duration analysis conditions on such past events and, hence, is well suited to flesh out causal relations. 6 In other techniques, such as panel methods that dummy the event, right-censoring could cause statistical issues. This is not the case in duration models. Hazard regression models incorporate a positive probability that the event might never occur for some of the cross-sectional units. This characteristic allows us to describe discontinuation of coverage.
Data and sampling procedures
Our data are all analysts who covered stocks by issuing research reports during 1994, a year characterized by an absence of particularly sensitive financial issues or market turbulence. The I/B/E/S database identifies the names of analysts covering a given stock, the brokerage house the analysts work for, and the report date.
7 Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007) show that business relations at the brokerage firm level affect an individual analyst's decision to cover a stock-issuing firm. Thus, we explore the business relations between stocks and the research departments of brokerage houses (hereafter research departments). The fact that listed companies report their analyst coverage primarily by using the brokerage firm name, not often by naming the analysts, also supports our approach to analyze this coverage at the research department level. Our sampling procedure lets us identify 16,824 observations as distinct relationships between research department i and stock j (i ¼ 1,2,y,154, and j ¼ 1,2,y, 4,121). From the standpoint of the covering subject, during 1994, 154 research departments covered up to 976 stocks with an average of 109 stocks. From the standpoint of the covered object, the average stock received coverage by four research departments in 1994. For example, Goldman Sachs issued research reports on 729 stocks, while Bear Stearns covered 478 stocks. Although some companies such as Intel Corp. were covered by both brokerage houses, the two relations (Goldman Sachs-Intel and Bear Stearns-Intel) are distinct and generate two separate observations in our data set. The relation between the research department and a covered stock is at issue. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of research department-stock observations. Our sample includes almost all stocks in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index. Not surprisingly, the 483 large-cap stocks in the S&P 500 are analyzed by considerably more research departments than the average sample stock. Research department-S&P 500 stock observations represent 29% of the sample. Stocks tend to be listed in the main US markets, the NYSE or the Nasdaq, with NYSE-listed companies being the most represented in the sample (59%). Only 2% of the sample observations are traded on the Amex; 10% are traded over the counter or on regional exchanges, such as the Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Pacific, and Philadelphia stock exchanges. Fewer utility stocks are covered than tech stocks. However, more research departments cover utility stocks than tech stocks. This is consistent with Bhushan (1989) and O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) , who show that utilities or stocks in regulated industries attract a higher analyst following. As a result, sample observations include utility stocks and tech stocks in roughly equal proportions (7% for both).
Two types of affiliation can occur in the relations between research department i and stock j. While the first type of affiliation is commonly defined in the literature on analyst coverage, the definition of the second type is less conventional. The first type of affiliation involves the research department's investment bank. Research department i covering stock j is affiliated with an investment bank if shares j were underwritten by the research department's investment bank. In other words,
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6 Suppose N t is the number of occurrences of the event up to time t and X t is a set of variables that could depend on N tÀ1 . Unlike logit or probit models, duration analysis techniques explicitly stratify the process of N t conditional on N tÀ1 so that the nature of the estimated relation between N t and X t is truly causal.
7 This study focuses on RECDATS (Recommendation Date) as the report date, and not REVDATS (Review Date) that is ''the most recent date on which IBES called the analyst and verified that particular estimate is still valid for that analyst'', as described on the I/B/E/S website. The choice leads to underestimate the proportion of reiterated (footnote continued) recommendations in our analysis but better captures the time when an analyst truly intends to report on a stock. There is no change in the qualitative conclusions of our analysis, when we include REVDATS as a report date.
an affiliation exists when the in-house investment bank served as a lead or co-lead manager in the most recent SEO or debt issue. If there is no SEO or debt issue, then an affiliation exists when the in-house investment bank was the lead or co-lead manager at the time of the IPO. A business relation between the issuer and nonmanaging syndicate is assumed to be weak (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara, 2000; Corwin and Schultz, 2005) . Data on investment banking affiliations come from the SDC database. In our second use of affiliation, research department i covering stock j is considered affiliated with the asset management when at least one of the affiliated mutual funds already holds stock j in its portfolio. For example, Prudential Financial manages several mutual funds. The CDA/Spectrum Institutional Money Manager (13f) Holdings database aggregates the ownership data from individual mutual funds to a family level on a quarterly basis. As a money manager for the family funds, Prudential reports its holdings of Intel at the end of the fourth quarter 1994. So, we regard the Prudential research department covering Intel as an affiliated department, starting from first quarter 1995, when the 13f holdings are disclosed. Fig. 1 shows the two types of affiliations within a typical full-service brokerage house.
Like the investment banking affiliation, the mutual fund affiliation involves three parties: a listed stock, the mutual funds collectively holding that stock, and the research department covering that stock. In our use of mutual fund affiliation, the fact that a brokerage firm offers asset management services does not result in a mutual fund affiliation unless the stocks held by the broker's mutual funds are also covered by the broker's research department. At the end of 1994, about 21% of our sample received coverage from a research department affiliated with an investment bank that had recently provided underwriting services. More than one-fourth of the sample appears in the portfolios of mutual funds affiliated with the research department. Just 6% of our sample is affiliated with both investment bank and mutual funds. Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the sample of research department-stock observations, 1994. Our data have all research departments that covered stocks by releasing reports during 1994. Utility companies operate in the two-digit SIC industry of 49; tech companies are defined as in the four-digit SIC codes in Loughran and Ritter (2004) . A stock is said to be covered by a research department affiliated with an investment bank when the affiliated investment bank served as the lead or co-lead manager of the most recent seasoned equity offering (SEO) or convertible and nonconvertible debt issue. If there is no equity or debt issue, an investment banking affiliation exists when the affiliated investment bank was the lead or co-lead manager at the time of the initial public offering (IPO). A stock is said to be covered by a research department affiliated with mutual funds when the affiliated mutual funds collectively held that stock at the end of quarter tÀ1. 

Univariate analysis
This study uses the frequency of coverage as a measure of analyst interest in sample stocks and the proportion of upgrades to a ''strong buy'' rating as a measure of analyst optimism. Both measures are determined on a quarterly basis. First, frequency of coverage accounts for a research department's decision about reporting on a stock. Analysts are not obliged by law to report on a regular basis. Generally, an analyst issues a report on a stock when new information changes his or her valuation. Listed companies are required to disclose their financial statements quarterly, which can make analysts willing to update prior views. Every quarter, research department i can decide to issue or to withhold a report on stock j. The quarterly frequency of coverage is defined as the number of observations receiving reports divided by the total number of possible coverage events. In the last quarter of 1994, research departments released reports on less than a third of the sample: The frequency of coverage was 27.87% (that is, 4,689 out of 16,824 potential events). Second, the proportion of upgrades to a ''strong buy'' rating accounts for a research department's decision to cover a stock optimistically. Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003) note that analyst rating schemes are not standardized and can vary from one firm to another, so we use the standard I/B/E/S ratings that range on a five-point scale (with 1 ¼ strong buy and 5 ¼ sell). Recommendations by research departments are mapped to one of the five standard values. If research department i releases multiple reports on a given stock j in quarter t, we use the first report issued in that quarter. We regard an upgrade to ''strong buy'' as the most optimistic rating because it exceeds both a research department's prior views and the consensus expressed by other departments on a seasoned stock. In the last quarter of 1994, the proportion of upgrades from buys, holds, underperforms, or sells to strong buys was 18.87% (885 of 4,689 issued reports), which is above the 16% proportion in a uniform distribution of changes in analyst ratings.
The last quarter of 1994 is taken as the baseline quarter 0. This study analyzes the 16,824 sample relationships between research departments and stocks over 48 consecutive quarters, from the first quarter of 1995 through the fourth quarter of 2006. These relations are naturally subject to right-censoring because of the concentration of brokerage firms in the securities industry or because of stock delisting or both. Mergers and acquisitions in the late 1990s significantly reduced the number of brokerage firms. We designate research departments incorporated into an acquiring bank as censored from the time of the acquisition, because clienteles and analyst specialties could change after a merger. For example, we remove from our design the Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette research department in the last quarter of 2000 upon its acquisition by Credit Suisse First Boston, even though individual analysts might have kept working for the acquirer. As of the end of 2006, of the initial 154 research departments, 136 remained uncensored. Similarly, stockissuing firms were censored once they merged with other listed companies. At the end of 2006, 1,656 stocks remained of the initial 4,121. Over the 12-year period, the combined censoring effects result in 7,753 of 16,824 relations being uncensored as of the end of the 48th quarter. Fig. 2 plots the frequency of coverage and proportion of upgrades to ''strong buy'' for the 1995-2006 period. Controlling for censoring in the relations between research departments and covered stocks, we find that the quarterly frequency of coverage declined from about 20-10% throughout the first four years. During the three years of 1999-2001, the production of reports remained below 10%. This low production could be explained by the uncertainty characterizing the market during the 1999-2000 bubble and its subsequent burst in 2001. Limits in the research resources within brokerage firms could also explain the reduced interest. During that time, analysts' attention might have been focused more on initiating relations with the newly listed firms than on cultivating the established relations with seasoned firms. In 2002, market watchers witnessed a renewal of analysts' interest in the sample stocks. In the third quarter of 2002, the coverage rate jumped to about 23%, even more than the frequency recorded at the beginning of 1995. The major rise in September 2002 was temporary, and a steady fall followed in the years after that. From 2002 through 2006, the frequency of coverage averaged around 8%.
Changing market conditions and changing regulations explain the spike in the number of reports released in third quarter 2002. The first changes in analyst regulations were enacted during the summer of 2002 when the bear market triggered concerns that investors might have been misled by biased analyst research and some analysts were found guilty. In July 2002, following the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the NASD and NYSE set new rules (NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472) restricting communications between investment banking and research functions. Analysts since then have been required to disclose the distribution of the ratings assigned to a given stock in the prior 12 months, along with the percentage of buys, holds, and sells assigned to all covered stocks. On August 2, 2002, the SEC proposed the Analyst Certification Rule, requiring that any research report include both a certification that any assessments must reflect the analyst's personal views and an account of any compensation received by the analyst to control the appearance, or any suggestion, of a conflict of interest. The provisions of NASD Rule 2711 about the disclosure of rating distributions became effective on September 9, 2002. As described in Cliff (2007) , I/B/E/S reports a great number of recommendations from Sunday, September 8 to Monday, September 9, 2002. In Fig. 2 , the dotted line adjusts for the 721 sample reports that were issued on those two days to comply with the new rules.
Also, Fig. 2 traces the evolution in the proportion of upgrades to ''strong buy'' over 48 quarters. This trend is essentially in the opposite direction as the quarterly frequency of coverage. During the bubble period, from 1999 to 2000, when research departments seemed to pay little attention to sample firms, they were exceptionally optimistic in their reports. In the first quarter of 2000, when the Nasdaq Composite index reached its all-time high, the proportion of strong buys that upgraded prior ratings exceeded 24%. In 2002, the surge in the frequency of coverage was accompanied by a drop in optimism. It was the year of most legal actions against analysts that led to new rules. In that year, research industry experienced a shock. In reaction to that shock, the upgrades to ''strong buy'' in the third quarter of 2002 were the lowest point in the sample. From 2002 through 2006, upgrades to ''strong buy'' averaged around 9%.
Hypotheses 1 and 2: frequency and optimism of analyst coverage and mutual fund affiliation
In our sample, the average stock receives three reports over a 12-year period. Some stocks receive consistent coverage. For example, Smith Barney released reports on Dell Inc. in 22 of the 48 quarters between 1995 and 2006. Other stocks see no coverage for long periods but then regain analysts' attention (e.g., after seven years of silence, in November 2002, Bear Stearns issued a report on May Department Stores). Another group of companies receives no coverage for several years in a row so, at least ex post, we would reasonably infer termination of coverage. Three main factors explain the production of research reports as well as the optimism expressed in the reports: stock characteristics, firm performance, and research department characteristics.
Stock characteristics, such as size, listing exchange, and industry, could affect the probability of research coverage of a stock. Prior studies examine the stock features affecting the number of analysts who follow a given stock, not the frequency of coverage. Chung (2000) claims that, in their duties of providing marketing aids to brokerage firms, analysts tend to research high-quality stocks. Large established companies included in benchmark industry indexes are thus likely to be regularly assessed by more analysts. O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) find that the number of analysts following a stock increases as that stock's volatility declines. Analysts are therefore more likely to cover regulated industries.
The operating performance of a stock-issuing firm is a likely determinant of coverage decisions. The better the firm's growth prospects, the higher the probability it attracts analyst coverage. Also, Brennan and Hughes (1991) find that price performance is a significant determinant. Their evidence shows that the number of analysts reporting on a stock rises as the price of that stock falls, because brokers have incentive to produce research on low-price stocks to generate a greater quantity of trading commissions.
Research department characteristics include their size and affiliations. First, the size of a research department could affect its continuing release of reports. At the end of 1994, the median department consisted of 38 analysts. Median department size more than doubled over the Frequency of coverage is determined as the number of research department-stock observations with at least one report during the quarter divided by the overall number of uncensored research department-stock observations at the end of that quarter. For example, in the first quarter of 1995 (quarter 1), the frequency of coverage was equal to 20.47%, determined as 3,309 reports divided by 16,163 total number of uncensored research department-stock observations. Proportion of upgrades to strong buy is determined as number of reports upgrading a stock to a ''strong buy'' rating divided by the overall reports issued in a quarter.
bubble period and notably contracted in the last years of our 12-year sample period. Second, affiliation with other brokerage departments (in particular, with mutual funds) is the explanatory variable of our interest, which we expect to affect both frequency and optimism of analyst coverage. Table 2 focuses on stock characteristics as a factor affecting an analyst's decision. Panel A of Table 2 assesses the relation between frequency of coverage and the major characteristics of stocks. Data are updated quarterly. During the 12-year period, the average coverage rate of 10.45% for all uncensored observations is taken as a reference point. Not surprisingly, a firm's size appears to affect the frequency of coverage: Stocks in the S&P 500 index garner research coverage at an above-average rate. The same is true for stocks traded on the NYSE. Amexlisted stocks are covered even less frequently than are stocks traded over the counter or on regional exchanges. The average utility stock also receives less attention than do tech stocks. Over three subperiods, 1995-1998, 1999-2001, and 2002-2006 , stocks generally experience a decline in coverage. Between 2002 and 2006, stocks traded over-the-counter or on regional exchanges and utility stocks experience an increase in coverage. Panel B of Table 2 reports the proportions of upgrades to ''strong buy'' ratings categorized by stock characteristics. From 1995 to 2006, the overall proportion of upgrades to strong buy is 16.43%. While size appears to drive the frequency of coverage, growth prospects seem to direct analyst optimism. Nasdaq-listed stocks and tech stocks enjoy an above-average proportion of upgrades to ''strong buy''. The analysis by subperiods over time confirms the pattern of Fig. 2 : The favorable disposition toward sample stocks strengthened during the Internet bubble and weakened after its burst. The increased coverage about utility stocks during 2002-2006 did not imply optimism in ratings. The unfavorable coverage took place in the aftermath of the Enron scandal while major debt issues were offered to finance projects in the newly deregulated energy markets.
To analyze the relation between analyst coverage and firm operating performance, we use the market-book value ratio (MBV), actual earnings per share (EPS), and revenues to measure, respectively, firm growth prospects, profitability, and efficiency. MBV is defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of longterm debt and preferred stock, divided by the book value of total assets. EPS are the quarterly basic earnings per share divided by the closing price at the end of each quarter. Revenues are divided by total assets as a measure of asset turnover. We include three more indicators: return on equity (ROE), dividend yield, and leverage ratio. ROE is calculated as quarterly earnings divided by the book value of equity. The dividend yield is defined as quarterly dividends per share divided by the closing price Table 2 Frequency and optimism of analyst coverage by stock characteristics and subperiods. The frequency of analyst coverage is determined as the number of research department-stock observations with at least one report during the quarter divided by the total number of research department-stock observations at the end of that quarter. Analyst optimism is defined as the proportion of upgrades to a ''strong buy'' rating. Both frequencies of coverage and upgrades to strong buy control for right-censorship due to concentration in the research industry or stock delisting or both. The 721 reports issued from September 8 to September 9, 2002 at the end of each quarter. The leverage ratio is long-term debt divided by the book value of equity. All indicators are quarterly updated. They are also lagged by one quarter. The choice of the stock to analyze in a report could be also related to technical analysis or price momentum considerations. So, we look at the closing prices of stocks covered during quarter t exceeding the 200-day moving average in the period. We use the 200-day moving average for three reasons: First, a long period smoothes price trends and makes results less sensitive to short-term volatility. Second, in a bull market, stock prices tend by construction to hover above their shorter moving averages when the last closing price exceeds the 200-day moving average. This phenomenon controls for the times the 200-day moving average is exceeded around the end of the quarter. Third, the 200-day moving average is regularly examined by technical analysts who believe that the lower the percentage of listed stocks that are trading above their 200-day moving average, the more bullish the market will be.
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Panel A of Table 3 reports, for the 1995À2006 period, the median operating and financial performance in quarter tÀ1 of firms receiving reports in quarter t. Mean values and standard deviations are also reported. The analysis suggests that research departments generally pick good stocks to present in their reports. Stocks in analyst reports are those with higher median MBV ratios, higher quarterly EPS/price, higher ROE, or higher dividend yields than stocks that have not been covered. Twosample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (two-sample t-tests) confirm the significance of the differences in median (mean) performance, in each quarter, between stocks that do and do not receive coverage. Subsample results indicate that stocks receiving coverage perform significantly better by all indicators except for revenues divided by assets and leverage ratios. Stocks receiving coverage have higher median revenues divided by assets than the control firms until 1998, when a reversal in the rankings occurs. More indebted firms receive preferential coverage in the latter part of the sample period. In the 2002À2006 subperiod, when stock indexes declined, dividend yields of covered stocks significantly increased. This rise can be related to the increased coverage of utility stocks reported in Panel A of Table 2 . Since 2002, as a reaction to the corporate earnings scandals, utilities and other high-yield firms boosted their dividends. The cut of the tax rate on dividends in early 2003 supported the rise in payouts. Table 3 reports performance indicators for stocks receiving upgrades to ''strong buy''. Consistent with Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) , analysts strongly recommend ''glamour'' stocks with high MBV ratios, high ROE, low leverage ratios, or positive momentum. Although high-yield stocks attract more coverage, they receive fewer upgrades to ''strong buy'' than do low-yield stocks. This preference for low-yield stocks endures over the 2002-2006 subperiod. Table 4 categorizes frequency and optimism of analyst coverage by research department affiliations and subperiods. Both investment banking affiliation and mutual fund affiliation are time-varying. That is, the affiliation between research departments and investment banks is updated by checking the managing syndicates of the sample's 1,340 SEOs and 31,996 convertible and nonconvertible debt issues during the 12-year period. Similarly, a research department's affiliation with mutual funds is updated by analyzing the composition of portfolios quarter by quarter. A research department is considered to have a mutual fund affiliation one quarter after the in-house mutual fund manager discloses that the funds hold a stock that the research department covers.
Both research department affiliations matter. Panel A of Table 4 focuses on the investment banking affiliation. From 1995 to 2006, research departments more frequently cover stocks underwritten by the affiliated investment banks than stocks underwritten by other investment banks: 12.79% compared with 9.85%. Consistent with prior studies, we find that research departments tend to be favorable on stocks if they are affiliated with those investment banks that had provided issuers with underwriting services. Their optimism is expressed by means of reiterations of ''strong buy'' ratings. 9 The high proportion of reiterated strong buys makes these research departments favorable in terms of average recommendation and deviation from consensus assessment. 10 However, stocks underwritten by affiliated investment banks receive as many upgrades to the ''strong buy'' list as other stocks. The analysis by subperiods confirms these suggestions about the influence that investment banking affiliation has on analyst coverage. In particular, from 1999 to 2001, when sample stocks experience a decline in coverage, research departments affiliated with investment banks issue more reports and more strong buys than do unaffiliated departments. In the latter subperiod, the proportion of strong buys sharply drops and affiliated departments finally align with unaffiliated departments in their ratings. Similarly, Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2005) find that, after adoption of the new analyst regulations, the likelihood of issuing an optimistic recommendation on a firm no longer depends on whether
9 Reiterations might be issued to resume coverage after a period of silence due to, for example, the participation of the affiliated investment bank in an underwriting deal. We thank Alexander Ljungqvist for this valuable comment. When we remove any reiteration that follows the announcement of a stop of coverage in the I/B/E/S Stopped Recommendations tape, results do not change. 10 Deviation from consensus is the difference between a sample rating and the consensus valuation on a stock. Deviation from consensus ranges from À4.00 to 4.00, where a positive deviation indicates that the covering research department agrees that stock j should have a less favorable rating than does the consensus. Consensus, which is defined as the average rating assigned by all analysts to stock j in quarter t, is obtained from I/B/E/S as an exogenous variable. It considers all the ratings assigned in the analyst industry, including those analysts who initiate coverage and those analysts who already covered the sample stocks. As McNichols and O'Brien (1997) suggest, an initial bias in the selection of stocks explains the optimism in the first rating, as research coverage is initiated by analysts. Because our sample includes only those research departments that are already covering stocks, our sample ratings are on average less favorable than the I/B/E/S consensus valuations. The average deviation from consensus is equal to 0.09. Standard deviation and skewness are 0.85 and 0.18, respectively. the affiliated investment bank had provided underwriting services to that firm. Portfolio investments by mutual funds also affect affiliated research departments' selection of stocks covered. Panel B of Table 4 focuses on mutual fund affiliation. Over the 12-year period, stocks held by affiliated mutual funds receive a higher coverage (13.06%) but just as many upgrades to the ''strong buy'' list (16.36%) as do other stocks. In spite of this, the analysis by subperiods reveals an interesting pattern in the change of recommendations. From 1995 to 2001, research departments affiliated with mutual funds express their optimism by means of upgrades to ''strong buy''. In particular, in the 1999-2001 subperiod, stocks in affiliated fund portfolios receive the most optimism in terms of awarded strong buys (both upgrades and reiterations). The average deviation from consensus is À0.01, implying that the covering research department grants to stock j a more favorable rating than does the consensus. In the 2002-2006 subperiod, research departments become significantly less favorable on stocks in the affiliated portfolios.
Each October, Institutional Investor announces its AllAmerica Research Team, which includes, for each industry, the four sell-side analysts who provided the highest research quality according to money managers and institutions and who are consequently deemed ''star'' analysts. Stickel (1992) finds that the prestige resulting from being selected as a star analyst by this investor magazine is well deserved. Stars do outperform other analysts for accuracy, frequency, and price impact of their forecasts, thus earning their designation. Considering that their reputation is at stake, we expect star analysts to report less optimism in covering stocks held by affiliated mutual funds. Reports by these stars represent 24% of the 12-year sample reports issued by research departments affiliated with mutual funds. In the years before 2002, star analysts were the group giving the most positive ratings when they covered stocks held by affiliated mutual funds. Average differences in the star analysts' upgrades to ''strong buy'' are statistically significant during the 1995À1998 and 1999À2001 subperiods at the 7% and 1% level, respectively. Since 2002, star analysts have become more reluctant to issue an upgrade to ''strong buy'' than have nonstar analysts. Finally, comparing the two panels of Table 4 , investment banking affiliation and mutual fund affiliation are associated with frequencies of coverage and upgrades to ''strong buy'' that are similar in magnitude. However, this similarity cannot be explained by overlaps between the two groups of affiliated research departments. Only 6% of the sample is affiliated with both investment banks and mutual funds as of the end of 1994, and this proportion declines over years.
Hypothesis 3: frequency and optimism of analyst coverage and portfolio weights
We conjecture that brokerage firms could want to support the performance of affiliated mutual funds. If so, we would expect that the more an institutional investor has invested in a stock, the more inflated the analyst rating on that stock. Table 5 tests this hypothesis. Portfolio weight is the percent weight of a stock investment in the affiliated fund portfolios at the end of quarter tÀ1. Portfolio weight is lagged by one quarter so that it is possible to see whether investment size affects the ratings assigned by affiliated research departments in quarter t, and not the reverse.
11 From 1995 through 2006, the median stock investment weighs 0.02% of the affiliated mutual funds (i.e., an investment of $4.9 million). The distribution of portfolio weights is highly right-skewed with a mean value of 0.18%. Table 5 reports frequency and optimism of coverage as portfolio weight of a stock in the affiliated funds rises. Throughout the 12-year period, research departments are more favorably disposed toward stocks held in larger proportions by the affiliated mutual funds. From the first quintile (the smallest portfolio weight) to the fifth quintile (the largest portfolio weight), stocks receive more frequent reports and more optimistic ratings. The relation between weight and optimism indicators, such as upgrades to ''strong buy'', strong buys, average rating, and average deviation from consensus, is generally monotonic. Yet, no monotonic relation exists between portfolio weight and upgrades. The t-tests for differences in frequencies and upgrades to ''strong buy'' between the highest and the lowest quintile are statistically significant from 1995 through 2006. In particular, during 1999À2001, the negative deviation from consensus indicates that analysts are most optimistic on the seasoned stocks largely held by affiliated funds. The higher optimism on these stocks becomes lower pessimism in 2002À2006.
To sum up, univariate results offer some insight into all three hypotheses. Mutual fund affiliation affects analysts' decisions to cover a stock and cover it optimistically. The more a stock weighs in the affiliated portfolios, the more favorable analyst recommendations are for that stock.
Before testing our hypotheses in a multivariate framework, we analyze changes in frequency and optimism of analyst coverage in response to changes in research department affiliation. If mutual fund affiliation influences analyst coverage, we expect to see a change in analyst coverage around the time a firm is added to an affiliated mutual fund's portfolio. For each research department-stock observation, we identify the quarter when the stock is first added to the affiliated fund portfolio. Suppose that Goldman Sachs mutual funds hold no Alcoa stock at the end of quarter Q À1 , while Goldman Sachs analysts have been covering Alcoa. During the following quarter, Goldman Sachs mutual funds net buy Alcoa so that they collectively report holdings of Alcoa at the end of quarter Q 0 . We regard the presence of a stock in
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11 Using a proprietary data set, Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2006) show abnormally high institutional trading volume beginning five days before ''buy'' recommendations are publicly released. Their evidence is consistent with institutional traders receiving tips about the contents of forthcoming analysts' reports. Anecdotal evidence suggests that analysts could tip off affiliated fund managers prior to releasing a report on a stock. See, for example, Wall Street Journal (2007), The apparent link from affiliated fund holdings to analyst recommendations might arise from tipping. Unfortunately, we cannot observe this practice in our public data.
the affiliated funds as a binary variable, without discriminating among investment amounts. To clearly observe the event effects over time, we confine the analysis to those observations in which the affiliated mutual funds have not held the stock for at least four quarters before quarter Q 0 but they have been holding the stock for at least four quarters after quarter Q 0 .
For 2,215 uncensored research department-stock observations, Panel A of Table 6 describes the changes in frequency and optimism of coverage as the pressure from mutual fund affiliation is activated in Q 0 . Some suggestions of concurrent effects are found in quarter Q 0 . While the average consensus assessment slightly changes in Q 0 , affiliated research departments upgrade their prior views so that the average rating significantly improves from 2.33 in Q À1 to 2.14 in Q 0 , suggesting that mutual funds could follow what their sell-side analysts indicate. However, the quarterly update of our data does not establish which comes first, an analyst's recommendation or a mutual fund's net buying activity. In the quarters after mutual Table 5 Frequency and optimism of analyst coverage by portfolio weight quintiles for affiliated mutual funds. Portfolio weight is defined as the weight of stock j in the mutual fund portfolios at the end of quarter tÀ1. P-values for differences within subsample means are from standard t-tests. Average deviations from consensus are different from zero at the 1% level except for the ones with a y superscript. 
0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 Table 6 Frequency and optimism of analyst coverage in response to changes in research department affiliations. In Panel A the event occurs during quarter 0 when the affiliated mutual funds first add stock j in their portfolios. The sample is limited to those observations in which the affiliated mutual funds have not held the stock for at least four quarters before quarter 0 and they have been holding the stock for at least four quarters after quarter 0. In Panel B the event occurs during quarter 0 when the affiliated mutual funds completely unload stock j in their portfolios. The sample is limited to those observations in which the affiliated mutual funds have been holding the stock for at least four quarters before quarter 0 and they do not hold the stock anymore for at least four quarters after quarter 0. Active change in portfolio weight is defined as the difference between the adjusted weight of stock j in the mutual fund portfolios at the end of quarter t (as if the stock price has not changed from the end of quarter tÀ1) and the weight of stock j in the mutual fund portfolios at the end of quarter tÀ1, p
(where p and S are stock price and number of shares held at the end of the quarter, respectively). In Panel C the SEO quarter 0 marks the event when the affiliated investment bank is hired (replaced) as an underwriter for stock j. Average deviations from consensus are different from zero at the 1% level except for the ones with a y superscript. Panel A. Affiliated mutual funds load stock j during quarter Q 0 Affiliated mutual funds do not hold stock j Affiliated mutual funds hold stock j funds first load the stock, Q +1 , Q +2 , Q +3 , and Q +4 , the affiliated research departments issue more frequent reports and a higher proportion of strong buys (both upgrades and reiterations) than in the prior quarters, Q À1, Q À2 , Q À3 , and Q À4 . Also, there are smaller proportions of downgrades. The average rating is favorable, especially compared with the consensus. In quarter Q +2 , research departments are exceptionally optimistic on the stocks held by affiliated funds. The average rating of 2.01 is significantly more favorable than the consensus. This upsurge in optimism occurs in a quarter when the in-house mutual funds are net sellers of the recommended stocks, as the portfolio weight significantly decreases (À0.12%, on average). Panel B of Table 6 reports event statistics as mutual funds unload a stock during quarter Q 0 . Also in this case, we restrict the analysis to 2,485 uncensored observations in which the affiliated mutual funds had been holding the stock for at least four quarters before quarter Q 0 but did not hold the stock for at least four quarters after Q 0 . As long as a stock is in the affiliated portfolios, research departments frequently issue reports on that stock, and the issued reports are generally optimistic in terms of strong buys and average rating. The comparison between the average rating by affiliated research departments and average consensus offers some interesting insights. From Q À1 to Q 0 , analyst valuations on the stocks held by the affiliated mutual funds worsen, on average, while average consensus improves. The net selling activity by in-house mutual funds is insignificant in Q À1 . It becomes significant in Q 0 when a large portion of the stock holdings is unloaded. During Q 0 affiliated analysts issue less numerous but more unfavorable reports than during the prior quarter. They continue to be more pessimistic than the consensus until Q +4 .
In Panel C of Table 6 , we report the changes in analyst coverage in response to changes in investment banking affiliation. Q 0 marks the quarter when an SEO occurs. Because our sample has a few events of hiring (replacement) of an investment bank as an underwriter, we extend the analysis over two years before and after the SEO quarter. In the year before the follow-on, from Q À4 through Q À1 , analysts affiliated with those investment banks hired to join the managing syndicate of the SEO had released positive recommendations, as indicated by the proportion of upgrades to ''strong buy'', upgrades in general, average rating, and average deviation from consensus. For that optimism they might have been hired later on. Conversely, in the year before the offering, analysts affiliated with those investment banks replaced in the SEO syndicate had issued a fair amount of positive recommendations but not enough to beat the consensus. During the SEO quarter, the replaced bank's analysts are more likely to reiterate or downgrade prior views on the former client's stock, and the average rating significantly worsens relative to the consensus.
Multivariate analysis
The choice to cover a stock (and cover it optimistically) can be modeled as dependent or independent from previous choices. We develop two multivariate analyses: duration and probit. Duration analysis differs in one fundamental way from probit analysis. While a duration model focuses on the conditional probability of coverage to persist over time as a function of a set of explanatory variables, a probit model links the unconditional probability of coverage at any point in time to a set of explanatory factors, independently of past decisions. In a duration model, in quarter t relative to the prior quarter tÀ1, each research department selects one of four observable behaviors: issuing another research report, switching to silence (reflecting a pause in coverage), continuing to be silent, or breaking the silence with a new report. In a probit model, in quarter t, each research department i simply decides to either release a report or be silent on stock j, regardless of prior decisions. Duration and probit methodologies complement each other in revealing key features of analyst optimism.
Multivariate duration analysis
We define the choice of covering a stock with at least one report as a failure event that is sampled at a quarterly frequency. Our study of the decision to continue research coverage is framed as a multiple-failure time analysis. Recurrent event data are frequently encountered in biomedical and economics investigations, and, we assert, they are suitable though not traditional in financial analyses. Time-to-event studies arise when two or more events could occur for each observation unit or subject. In our study, the subject is a unique pair consisting of research department i and stock j, and the failure event consists of issuing a report in quarter t. We treat the events according to a conditional-risk set model (Prentice, Williams, and Peterson, 1981) : A subject is not at risk of precipitating a second event until the first event has occurred, and so on. Thus, the conditional-risk set at time t for the event n concerns only those subjects under observation that have already experienced event nÀ1. Formally, let Z(t) denote the vector of covariates at time tX0 and N(t) denote the number of failures prior to time t. The counting process for N(t) is described by a random variable, assumed to be continuous. The hazard or intensity function l(t) is defined as the instantaneous rate of failure at time t, given the covariates and counting processes at time t:
PrftpT n t ð Þþ1 ot þ DtjNðtÞ; ZðtÞg=Dt.
(1)
Intuitively, the hazard function is similar to the instantaneous probability that a research department provides coverage, conditional on the history of decisions about whether to issue reports or not. In practice, we estimate the following Cox proportional-hazard model:
lftjZðtÞg ¼ l 0 ðtÞ exp½b 0 Z t , where lfÁg is called the hazard function and l 0 fÁg is the baseline hazard. We estimate the baseline hazard nonparametrically and the vector b illustrating the explanatory variables Z t by maximum likelihood. The nonparametric, data-driven estimate of l 0 fÁg makes results considerably robust.
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Our sample consists of research departments covering stocks during 1994. The last quarter of 1994 marks time 0, and data are left-censored by construction. We count the initial failure that is common to all stocks in our sample as a zero event. The counting process ranges, then, from zero to 22 failure events over 48 quarters, with 22 being the maximum number of reports written across all stocks. Time-varying covariates for the probability of providing coverage on seasoned stocks are l{t/N(t), Z (S&P500 The first six covariates relate to firm characteristics. The S&P500 COMPONENT is a dummy equal to one when the stock is in the Standard & Poor's 500 index at the end of each quarter. NASDAQ-LISTED, AMEX-LISTED, and OTHER MARKETS-TRADED are dummies for the listing on the Nasdaq, Amex, and other markets, respectively. UTILITY and TECH are dummies equal to one when companies operate, respectively, in the two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code of 49 and in the four-digit SIC codes specified in Loughran and Ritter (2004) . The next seven covariates measure a firm's operating and financial performance. To avoid a look-ahead bias, all accounting indicators are updated to the end of the prior quarter, tÀ1. MARKET-BOOK VALUE RATIO is defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book values of long-term debt and preferred stock, which are then divided by the book value of total assets. EPS/P is defined as earnings per shares divided by price to adjust for stock splits or reverse stocksplits. REVENUES/ASSETS are quarterly sales divided by total assets. ROE is quarterly earnings divided by the book value of equity. DIVIDEND YIELD is quarterly dividends per share divided by the closing price at the end of the quarter. LEVERAGE RATIO is long-term debt divided by the book value of equity. PRICE ABOVE 200-DAY MOVING AVERAGE, equal to one when the daily price happens to exceed the 200-day arithmetic moving average in quarter t, is intended to capture momentum in the decision to research a firm. Two dummies, INVESTMENT BANKING AFFILIATION and MUTUAL FUND AFFILIATION, account for research department affiliations. INVESTMENT BANKING AFFILIATION has a value of one when the research department is affiliated with an investment bank in the managing syndicate for the stock covered. To separate the long-term effects of investment banking affiliation from its effects at the time of an equity offering, we interact INVESTMENT BANKING AFFILIATION with SEO, which is equal to one when the company makes a new equity offering in quarter t, MUTUAL FUND AFFILIATION has a value of one when the research department is affiliated with mutual funds that hold, at the end of quarter tÀ1, the stock covered. Finally, we use two variables to control for size: RESEARCH DEPARTMENT SIZE, which is defined as the I/B/E/S number of analysts working for a research department, and LN(MARKET CAPITALIZATION), which is the logarithm of a firm's market value in millions of dollars at the end of quarter tÀ1.
In Panel A of Table 7 , the first three Cox regression models report the coefficients for the probability that a research department covers a stock. The signs of the coefficients in Model 1 confirm the results of the univariate analysis. Large-cap stocks reporting good operating and financial performance are persistently covered. In particular, high-dividend yields increase the probability the stock is followed. Price momentum also affects a research department's choice of covering a stock. 12 The affiliation between research department and an investment bank largely affects analysts' decisions to provide coverage during the quarter of a client's SEO. Afterward it affects analysts' decisions to provide continuing research on the client's stock to a lower extent. MUTUAL FUND AFFILIATION is directly useful in testing Hypothesis 1. Controlling for other factors, including the investment banking affiliation, we find that mutual fund affiliation significantly drives analysts' decision to continue covering a stock. Although hazard ratios are not reported in Panel A of Table 7 , they support a clearer interpretation than do the coefficients. When affiliated mutual funds report holdings of a stock at the end of quarter tÀ1, the probability that stock is covered in quarter t rises by 17%.
In Model 2, we include seven more dummies related to changes in a research department's affiliation. When an issuer confirms or hires a new investment bank as underwriter to manage an offering of new securities, the investment bank's research department is very likely to report on the issuer's stock during the SEO quarter. Yet, when an issuer replaces an investment bank that formerly served as an underwriter, the investment bank's analysts are no longer likely to cover that issuer's stock. The coefficient is negative but insignificant. Also, we find that research departments are 39% more likely to issue reports in the quarter after the stock is first added in the affiliated fund portfolios; 27% more likely after an increase in the stock investment by affiliated funds; 5% less likely after a decrease in the stock investment. No significant coverage is provided after the affiliated mutual funds fully unload the stock from their portfolios. This suggests that sell-side analysts likely provide coverage to meet demands for research from the affiliated asset managers. Similarly, Irvine, Simko, and Nathan (2004) find that analysts are likely to initiate coverage on a stock after the fund family invests in that stock.
As a robustness check, model 3 uses an extended sample to include stocks whose coverage was initiated after 1994. One could be concerned that the reduction in the number of observations due to right-censoring alters the composition of sample firms over time and that uncensored stocks are larger at the end than at the beginning of the sample period. We thus add to the initial 16,824 observations 113,109 observations as relations between research departments and stocks that emerged after 1994. Most of these new observations relate to
12 When we replace the PRICE ABOVE 200-DAY MOVING AVERAGE dummy with the stock price at the end of quarter tÀ1, we still find the probability of covering a stock is positively associated with its price level. This result differs from the finding in Brennan and Hughes (1991).
Table 7
Models of the probability that research departments will (optimistically) cover a stock. in both panels, z-statistics are Lin and Wei's (1989) heteroskedasticity-adjusted. Standard errors are adjusted for intragroup correlation among stocks and research departments. *** indicates different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 1995-1998 1999-2001 2002-2006 1995-1998 1999-2001 2002-2006 initiations on newly listed stocks (66%). The extended sample consists of 129,933 research department-stock pairs that are at risk over the sample period (i.e., a total of 6,366,717 time observations). As an additional robustness check, we remove covered stocks that are always in the affiliated fund portfolios. This occurs when, for example, the fund family offers index funds. Similarly, we remove stocks that are never in the fund portfolios. This occurs when, for example, there is no fund portfolio, because the brokerage firm offers no asset management services. Using this extended sample, Cox results seem to polarize analyst attention between S&P stocks and recent IPOs. While ongoing coverage mainly relates to large, wellestablished firms, initiations of coverage cluster during the bubble period when small young firms with negative earnings went public and, shortly after their IPOs, offered new shares in the main markets. In fact, from the comparison between Model 3 and Model 1, three coefficients differ in magnitude: OTHER MARKETS-TRADED dummy, DIVIDEND YIELD, and SEO dummy. However, Model 3 confirms the results in Model 1 for the variable of interest, MUTUAL FUND AFFILIATION. To test Hypothesis 2 in a multivariate setting, we also estimate Cox regression models that define the failure event as the decision of a research department to issue at time t a favorable recommendation. The probability of releasing an optimistic report is explained by the same covariates related to stock characteristics, operating and financial performance, and research department features. In Panel A of Table 7 , Models 4-7 focus on the upgrade to ''strong buy'' as a measure of the strongest optimism. In Model 4, when an investment bank underwrites the stock, the affiliated analysts are more likely than are unaffiliated analysts to report favorably on that stock during the SEO quarter, but not afterward. This is consistent with the findings in O'Brien, McNichols, and Lin (2005) . When mutual funds hold a stock, the affiliated research department is 13% more likely than are unaffiliated departments to persistently provide favorable coverage on that stock. Compared with Model 1, the coefficients of LN(MARKET CAPITALIZATION) and DIVIDEND YIELD here are significantly negative. This confirms the suggestion that analysts are more likely to strongly recommend a glamour stock than a value stock. Moreover, it appears that research department size reduces analyst optimism. Model 5 includes dummies for changes in research department affiliations. The interaction variable, SEO Â REPLACED AFFILIATED INVESTMENT BANK, marks the end of the firm's relation with an investment bank that was used during a prior equity or debt issue. When an issuer replaces an investment bank to manage an offering of new securities, the probability that the former bank's analysts issue upgrades to ''strong buy'' declines. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 3% level. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) suggest that one reason companies change to a new underwriter for managing an SEO is to get higher quality research coverage. The flip side of the coin seems to be that, once an investment bank stops being a stock's underwriter, the affiliated research department has no incentive to provide strength of coverage on that stock. Results of Model 6 suggest that the higher the weight of the stock in the affiliated fund portfolios, the more optimistic the rating assigned. When a mutual fund family increases the weight of a stock investment by 1%, the probability that the affiliated analysts issue an upgrade to ''strong buy'' rises 25%. The presence of other institutional investors in a stock does moderate analyst optimism on that stock, but star analysts are associated with more optimistic ratings. Although analysts build their reputation among institutional investors primarily on their forecasting ability, career advancements also depend on the optimism of their recommendations. Controlling for accuracy, Hong and Kubik (2003) find that brokerage firms are likely to reward analysts who promote stocks with ratings bolder than the consensus. Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) show that a number of bold recommendations by stars have recently been ''anonymized'' from the 1993-2002 I/B/E/S tapes. Consistent with our findings, these anonymizations relate to some embarrassing recommendations issued by star analysts, while they affect no earnings estimate. Model 7 reports similar results for the enlarged sample that includes further initiations. We alternatively define analyst optimism as the release of a recommendation that is better than that given by the consensus, a ''strong buy'' rating, and an upgrade relative to prior rating. In untabulated results, we find that mutual fund affiliation dummies have positive and significant coefficients. Finally, in Models 8 and 9, the dependent variable is the issue of a negative rating. Analysts typically express their pessimism downgrading a stock in the affiliated fund portfolios to a ''hold'' rating, while they are reluctant to use more negative ratings. In fact, research departments are 15% less likely to issue ''underperform'' or ''sell'' ratings than unaffiliated departments.
Multivariate probit analysis
We next apply standard probit methods to the probability that research departments issue a report on a seasoned stock. Panel B of Table 7 reports probit coefficients for the 12-year period. We find that mutual fund affiliation significantly increases both the probability that a given stock is covered and the probability that the stock receives an upgrade to ''strong buy''. One might ask how robust the results are across subperiods. In the context of duration analysis, this question is far from natural, because dividing a sample into subperiods would alter the natural structure of the baseline period and the conditional dynamics of the failure events over subsequent periods. Thus we use probit methods because they assume temporal independence of the failure events. Panel B of Table 7 reports probit estimates for the same subperiods used earlier in the paper. Using shorter samples generally implies lower z-scores throughout. From 1999 through 2001, investment banking affiliation significantly placed pressure on analysts to issue optimistic ratings on the investment bank's client-stock. However, their optimism clustered during the SEO quarters and did not persist in other quarters. From 1995 through 2001, mutual fund affiliation made analysts significantly optimistic about stocks in the affiliated fund portfolios. In the latter subperiod, from 2002 through 2006, these affiliated analysts issued a lower proportion of upgrades to ''strong buy'' ratings than unaffiliated analysts. Yet, their decisions of upgrading a stock to ''strong buy'' were significantly associated with the portfolio weight of that stock in the fund family. Similar results are obtained either by bootstrapping the standard errors of the probit or by estimating a logistic regression. 
Simultaneity issues
Univariate and multivariate models show that the affiliation with mutual funds is associated with a more frequent and favorable analyst coverage. These results formally establish no causal link between mutual fund affiliation and analyst research. A simultaneous effect could be occurring: Mutual funds invest in stock j upon the analysts' recommendations. If so, a behavioral claim about analyst incentives could not be established. To explore the issue, this study estimates random-effects GLS regressions in which the change (between the end of quarter tÀ1 and the end of quarter t) in the shares held by affiliated mutual funds is explained by a number of variables, including optimism of the in-house analysts in quarter tÀ1. Under the null hypothesis of no simultaneity (that is, that mutual fund affiliation causes analysts' behaviors), we expect that analyst optimism fails to explain significantly the subsequent portfolio rearrangements for in-house mutual funds.
As reported in Columns 1a and 1b of Table 8 , past optimism of affiliated analysts fails to explain changes in mutual funds' portfolio weights. We obtain two sets of GLS coefficient estimates, depending on whether we model research department-level or stock-level unobserved heterogeneity. At both levels, changes in stock price, number of shares outstanding, and number of other mutual funds are the main significant explanatory factors. We find no evidence that changes in ratings are followed by any significant change in portfolio weight by in-house mutual funds.
14 Coefficients for upgrades to ''strong buy'' and downgrades are both insignificant, including when the ratings are issued by a star analyst. The evidence is at odds with a system of two-way simultaneous feedback and supports instead the idea that affiliation causes analysts to be favorable toward stocks within family portfolios. In Columns 2a and 2b of Table 8 , we replicate the analysis using variables reflecting the contemporaneous optimism of in-house analysts in quarter t. This version of the model reflects the possibility that information could efficiently flow within full-service brokerage firms so that analyst optimism could be reflected in concomitant portfolio changes of the affiliated funds. Random-effects regressions fail again to highlight a significant impact of analyst optimism on mutual fund behavior. The coefficient for a downgrade is negative and significant at the 4% level. Once more, when the analyst releasing an upgrade to ''strong buy'' or a downgrade is a star analyst, the affiliated mutual funds do not significantly change their holdings of the covered stock.
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13 We apply two robustness checks to our empirical results. First, we expand the set of variables controlling for business-cycle conditions to include lagged values of the growth rate of standard macroeconomic indicators, such as gross domestic product, inflation (as measured by the consumer price index), and the federal funds rate. The macro controls are significant, and they show the expected signs, signaling that better general conditions foster optimistic recommendations. All other variables of interest maintain the same signs as in Table 7 , and most estimated coefficients hardly change value or significance level. Second, we experiment with the random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) models that Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2007) use in a related application. Similarly, we model a continuous indicator of research optimism (defined as the ratio between the rating and the consensus) as a function of stock characteristics and research department features specified in Panel A of Table 7 (Model 6). We obtain two distinct sets of GLS coefficient estimates, depending on whether we model research department-level or stock-level unobserved heterogeneity. A larger institutional presence in the firm's equity makes optimism less likely. Yet, star designation makes optimism more likely, whatever the econometric framework.
14 In the cases of an upgrade to ''strong buy'' and of a downgrade given in quarter t, the active portfolio weight changes, in median, 0.0006% and À0.0002%, respectively, from the end of quarter tÀ1 to the end of quarter t. No median change can be observed in the cases of a reiteration and no rating. When more reports are issued by research department i on stock j in quarter tÀ1 (2% of the sample), we examine the change in ratings from the next-to-last report to the last report for the quarter. Later, when more reports are issued by research department i on stock j in quarter t, we examine alternately the analyst ratings in the first and last reports for the quarter. Results are insensitive to this choice.
Value of analyst optimism
6.1. Short-term value of analyst optimism Table 9 assesses, in the short run, the value of analysts' optimism and how their favorable disposition could affect stock prices. We use Eventuss for Cross-Sectional Analysis to determine the three-day abnormal returns for each stock that receives coverage. Day 0 marks the report date. We categorize the median three-day abnormal returns by change in the ratings. In Table 9 , a ''strong buy'' generates a significantly positive market impact. In particular, the median price impact is the greatest when research departments upgrade a stock in the affiliated mutual funds to a ''strong buy'' rating (1.62%). This abnormal return is significantly higher than the abnormal return on stocks receiving upgrades to ''strong buy'' from unaffiliated research departments: 1.20%. There is asymmetry in the price reaction when the rating is negative. A ''hold'' recommendation is generally considered bad news. When research departments affiliated with mutual funds reiterate or downgrade to such a negative rating, stocks display a negative abnormal return. This is also true for stocks rated that way by unaffiliated analysts. The difference between the threeday returns categorized by affiliation is not significant. When affiliated research departments downgrade to even worse ratings, such as an ''underperform'' or a ''sell'', the abnormal price reaction is negative but lower than the one produced by unaffiliated research departments downgrading to similar ratings: À0.80%, compared with À1.12%. This asymmetry in market reaction suggests that analysts could be more eager to deliver positive news than negative news.
We then categorize three-day returns by research department size. Large research departments of likely large brokerage firms are expected to generate a greater trade reaction than small research departments, as they have easier access to corporate management, more resources to support research, and more analysts following the same industry. We find that market participants discount the upgrades to ''strong buy'' released by small affiliated research departments but attribute superior information to the upgrades to ''strong buy'' issued by large affiliated research departments. When we categorize three-day returns by status of a star analyst within large research departments, it appears that investors rely on star analysts regardless of their mutual fund affiliation, while they give more credit to nonstar analysts when they are affiliated. Prices react significantly more to an upgrade Table 8 Random-effects generalized least squares model of active changes in portfolio weight in affiliated mutual funds. The dependent variable is the active change in the percent portfolio weight held by affiliated mutual funds between the end of quarter tÀ1 and the end of quarter t. Active change in portfolio weight is defined as the difference between the adjusted weight of stock j in the mutual fund portfolios at the end of quarter t (as if the stock price has not changed during quarter t) and the weight of stock j in the mutual fund portfolios at the end of quarter tÀ1. A constant intercept is estimated but not reported. CHANGE IN to ''strong buy'' issued by an affiliated nonstar analyst than to an upgrade to ''strong buy'' issued by an unaffiliated nonstar analyst: 1.98%, compared with 1.21%. However, downgrades to ''underperform'' or ''sell'' by affiliated nonstar analysts bring about lower three-day returns than those following downgrades by unaffiliated nonstar analysts: À0.66%, compared with À1.33%.
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Long-term value of analyst optimism
In the long run, value accrues to investors acting upon the positive recommendations on stocks held by the affiliated mutual funds. As in Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman. (2001) , we form portfolios based on analyst ratings and examine their long-run performance. In Table 9 Median three-day abnormal returns around the report day categorized by mutual fund affiliation. Three-day market-adjusted returns are determined by using the CRSP equally weighted NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq index. Day 0 marks the report date. To control for dependence in returns, a 255-trading day estimation period starting 46 days before the event date is used. Number of returns is in parentheses. There are 394 missing abnormal returns. Categorization by size of research departments is based on the quarterly median number of analysts working for a given brokerage firm. particular, on the day a recommendation is issued on a given stock, we systematically act upon that recommendation, by buying stocks that receive ''strong buy'' or ''buy'' ratings and by selling short stocks that receive ''underperform'' or ''sell'' ratings. 15 The portfolios built are value-weighted, that is, each stock is purchased or sold in a proportion equal to its relative weight on the total market portfolio. Each recommendation is assumed to stop influencing investment behavior after one year from its issue date. We report the raw (unadjusted) returns along with abnormal (adjusted) returns, which are returns in excess of compensation that risk would justify.
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Measures of abnormal returns correspond to two standard asset pricing models: the market model and the Fama and French three-factor model. As reported in Panel A of Table 10 , investing systematically in the upgrades to ''strong buy'' issued by affiliated analysts produces an annualized unadjusted return of 17.81%, compared with 14.84% from investing in the upgrades to ''strong buy'' by unaffiliated analysts. However, affiliated analysts' pessimism is less valuable than their optimism. Following ratings of ''sell'' by affiliated analysts produces an annualized unadjusted return of 7.31%, which is about 10% lower than the unadjusted return of the optimistic upgrades-to-strong-buy portfolio. When the negative ratings are issued by unaffiliated analysts, this return is equal to 10.23%, which is about 4% lower than the unadjusted return of the optimistic upgrades-to-strong-buy portfolio. Differences in abnormal returns from the market model and Fama and French three-factor model also lead to the qualitative conclusion that mutual fund affiliation biases analysts' eagerness to release positive or negative stock reports. We also categorize by research department size and analyst quality. Panel B of Table 10 focuses on research departments affiliated with mutual funds and categorizes portfolio returns by subperiods. In the 2002À2006 subperiod, when optimism of the affiliated research departments has declined, and they are no longer more likely to issue optimistic reports on stocks in the fund family, their investment recommendations become less informative for investors and the pessimistic ''sell'' ratings produce no significant return.
Finally, in untabulated results, we determine the annualized returns from mimicking 13f holdings or purchasing mutual fund shares. Following prior literature, we limit our analysis to US equity funds in four objective categories: aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, and equity income. Replicating the affiliated portfolio holdings leads to an unadjusted return of 12.89%, compared with 8.07% from replicating the unaffiliated holdings. Like in Grinblatt and Titman (1989) , this difference reduces considerably as we adjust returns for risk. The annualized Fama and French three-factor return from the affiliated 13f holdings is 1.42%, compared with 0.78% from the unaffiliated 13f holdings. As an alternative, an investor can simply purchase shares of the affiliated funds. Mutual fund share prices come from the daily CRSP mutual funds data set, linked to Thomson CDA Spectrum Mutual Funds Holdings. Purchasing affiliated shares produces insignificantly higher returns than purchasing unaffiliated shares. The unadjusted return is 12.45%, compared with 12.86%. Consistent with Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and James and Karceski (2006) , the risk-adjusted returns are much lower and hardly significant. The only significant result, at the 10% level, is that the purchase of unaffiliated shares does generate a negative Fama and French three-factor return of À1.69% to investors. The risk-adjusted returns from purchasing shares are lower than returns from mimicking the 13f holdings. One explanation could be that mutual funds charge fees, possibly in the form of hidden expenses.
Conclusions
In July 2002, a class action against Merrill Lynch & Co. was filed on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased shares of Internet Infrastructure HOLDRS, one of Merrill Lynch's exchange-traded funds. The complaint alleged that Merrill Lynch's sell-side analysts had issued such optimistic ratings for some seasoned stocks in the fund that the price of Internet Infrastructure HOLDRS became artificially inflated. According to the allegation, Merrill Lynch analysts engaged in such conduct despite knowing that the valuations of some Internet stocks, such as InfoSpace and Openwave Systems, could not be sustained, thus adversely affecting the fund's shareholders. In September 2007, a settlement of $125 million was approved against Merrill Lynch.
16
This paper responds to the question raised by this anecdotal case: Do a mutual fund's stock holdings affect the research produced by analysts affiliated with that mutual fund? After studying a large sample of recommendations provided by sell-side analysts on seasoned stocks for over 48 quarters, from 1995 through 2006, we find that analysts are significantly optimistic about stocks that are held by affiliated mutual funds. During the 1999-2001 subperiod, star analysts show the most optimism on these stocks. Controlling for several variables, including investment banking affiliation, our results indicate that the greater the affiliated mutual funds weigh a stock in their portfolios, the higher the analyst optimism. The stock that analysts are likely to promote is not only greatly represented in the affiliated fund portfolios but is also less visible to other institutions. Promoting stocks with an upgrade to strong buy produces a median three-day abnormal return of 1.62% around the report day. This return is 2.03% when the promoting analyst works in a large research department and 2.15% when he or she is also a star. In the long run, value also accrues to investors acting upon the positive ratings on stocks held by affiliated mutual funds. However, mutual fund affiliation diminishes analysts' eagerness to release negative investment recommendations so that, following
ARTICLE IN PRESS
15 To form the ''upgrade to strong buy'' portfolio, we follow a variation in the methodology as described in Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006) . A stock enters a portfolio of ''upgrades to strong buy'' at the close of trading on the day an upgrade to strong buy is issued. The stock is dropped from the portfolio when a downgrade is announced. 16 See PR Newswire (2002) an affiliated analyst's ''sell'' recommendations, we observe an annualized Fama and French three-factor abnormal return of 1.88%, compared with 3.63%, when the sells are issued by an unaffiliated analyst. Overall, these results suggest that mutual fund affiliation affects the strength of coverage provided by sell-side analysts.
In the last years of our sample period (since 2002), optimism has declined and analysts are no longer more likely to issue an overly optimistic recommendation on the stocks held by affiliated mutual funds. We argue that two reasons can explain the reduced optimism: changes in internal policies within brokerage firms and a heightened state of caution in analysts' behavior. First, in 2002, during the debate about analyst conflicts of interests, many recognized that mutual funds in general could exert pressure on analysts to issue favorable reports. The Association of Investment Management and Research proposed to its members standards meant to address directly this type of pressure. Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission also were aware of the mutual fund pressure. While regulators did not directly address the issue, many brokerage houses revised their internal practices on a voluntary basis. Second, the end of the Internet bubble was accompanied by legal actions for fraud against analysts and by other scandals. Some analysts were prosecuted, while some analysts resigned for personal reasons or because their research departments shut down and some went to work for the buy-side. Since 2002, the research industry has changed. More stringent policies and more cautious analysts' behavior have made affiliated research less optimistic. 17 It is unclear, however, whether the effects of these two transitory factors will last. In this paper, we do not intend to suggest that mutual fund affiliation exerts more important pressure on analysts than investment banking affiliation does; neither do we intend to take a normative position on the mutual fund affiliation of sell-side analysts. Instead, this paper provides evidence that, within a typical full-service brokerage firm, analysts are subject to multiple sources of pressure. The analyst regulations of 2002 focus on the affiliation with the investment banking department of a brokerage firm as a main source of biases for analyst research. The fact that underwriting is a lucrative business supports this focus. Whether mutual fund affiliation produces a conflict of interest is an open question. Contrary to articles in the financial press, the majority of academic research finds that analyst conflicts of interest have no systematic impact on investors, when important mechanisms, such as reputation and career concerns, restrain analysts' biases. In their review of the literature on conflicts of interest, Mehran and Stulz (2007) show that investors can benefit from the existence of such conflicts. For example, investors take advantage of more informative reports analysts can write using information flows from other departments of a full-service brokerage firm. In the same way, this paper shows that investors can earn higher returns by following an analyst's optimistic recommendations about a stock in the analyst's fund family than by following others' positive recommendations. Information flows between sell-side analysts and buy-side analysts likely enhance the content of a ''strong buy'' rating. However, the reluctance to issue pessimistic recommendations (the other side of analyst optimism) represents a bias that investors who use analyst ratings should take into account.
